Japan towards Reconciliation
The Case of Anglo-Japanese Reconciliation

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Introduction

The treatment by the Japanese of British POWs and civilian internees during the Second World War still causes *strains* in Anglo-Japanese relations, and the war memory has kept the British public at a "psychological distance" from Japan, as a Japanese spokesman acknowledged in an article of May 1998.[1)] On the other hand, little concern had been paid in Japan to the issue of the "Western, white" Allied prisoners until the end of the 1980s. "Anglo-Japanese reconciliation" was not always well-accepted subject and, indeed, even in the 1990s, a relative lack of interest was shown in the subject, compared to other related historical issues. I will discuss the Japanese treatment of POWs, and then look at

development and frustration of Anglo-Japanese postwar reconciliation.

1. Japan and European POWs

In the late nineteenth century, Japan genuinely concerned was to enter into the magic circle of "civilized nations" when, though of very different origins and attitudes, she first came into close contact with the international community of European origin. Displaying her "civilization", or her "cultural superiority" to other Asian countries, especially to the Chinese Empire, Japan signed the Red Cross Treaty in 1887 and then announced at the commencement of the war with China in 1894-95 that Japan would honor the internationally accepted laws of war.[2] The Japanese army treated prisoners of war quite humanely in the 1904-05 war with the Russian Empire.[3] In the war with the German Empire, 1914-1918, the Japanese again treated POWs well.

During the Asian Pacific War of 1941-45, however, the Japanese army behaved in a quite different way, which was not anticipated by those British officers who had known it very well in the 1920s and 1930s.[4] The army authority sent an official note to the expeditionary forces in December 1941 stating that: "We hope the POWs captured in the present war will be reasonably treated applying international laws accordingly".[5] Yet, when H.D.E. Sitwell, a British commander, tried in 1942 to put into his surrender terms a clause that POWs would be treated in Java according to the Geneva Convention in Java 1942, a Japanese staff officer "prickly" informed him that "Japan, the same as Great Britain, only stuck to the Geneva Convention when it suited her."[6]

Ironically, specifically for the period of the Russo-Japanese war, the

Japanese behaviors in the theatre of war had had an element of calculation in with the Western observers' - specifically her alliance, Britain's applauds and Britain encouraged the rest of the world to recognize that Japan, as a late-coming 'civilized' nation, deserved to be admitted to the select group of "great powers".[7] Throughout the Second World War, the Japanese mistreated British POWs in part to demonstrate their "cultural superiority" and as a way of paying back former sensitivities to "foreign slights".[8] For the captors who had become obsessed by the notion of an honorable death in the 1930s, to die honorably in battle was also a way of proving cultural superiority to the West. At the same time, in this "war over colonies" with the British, in which the Japanese always inflamed the passions which racial prejudice could stir up, their barbarous treatment of British nationals did, especially in the early stages of the war, enable them to bolster pride in Japan's self-proclaimed role as "defender of Asiatics."[9]

In January 1944, Anthony Eden stated in the House of Common that "the Japanese have violated, not only the principles of International Law, but the canons of decent and civilized conduct."[10] Until the end of the war, of the 50,016 British POWs captured by the Japanese, 12,433 died of maltreatment, disease, starvation and Allied bombing. Since they were released in 1945, the photographs and the details of the POWs camps of the Japanese had made the British public extremely shocked. Sir George Sansom, British representative on The Far Eastern Advisory Commission told Shidehara Kijûrôr, then Prime Minister, a few months after the end of the war that "the Japanese army was seriously damaged by the atrocities they committed rather than by the defeat itself."[11]

During postwar courts, Western intellectuals with skepticism about Euro-centric ideas of "civilization" or "culture" suspected that Japan's culture was, for instance, one of "shame" rather than "guilt" and that no one should punish a "man for living according to his own culture." Paolo Marella, apostolic delegate of the Holy See to Japan, spoke for the war criminals at the trial in Tokyo. His memorandum to the tribunal stated: "in order to arrive at an impartial judgement it is necessary to add that the Japanese do not have the ideas on the treatment of prisoners that a long period of Christian culture has given us." [12] The International Committee of the Red Cross similarly argued that the mistreatment of POWs was "doubtless due chiefly to the survival of certain ancestral ideas, according to which the status of prisoners of war is degrading." [13] Bert Röling, Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal judge and first IPRA Secretariat, later commented with respect to the racial aspects of prisoners' mistreatment, for example, that "the truth was…that it was very difficult for a tall, white man to be under the orders of the small, dark Japanese. They resented that more than anything else: to be under those fellows who in former days, as Asians, were always treated as second class people." [14]

What many Japanese had come to feel were their ordeals tended to take second place to the "unjust tragedies" suffered by former Japanese military men as a result of "unjust" or "mistaken" decisions imposed by the war victors during postwar trials. The Japanese cultural apologists suspected that, as far as the mistreatment of the European POWs was concerned, some Japanese, "for living according to his own culture", might have been included in those who were punished by the Western victors. Yet, Japan's war with the Western Allies was not a clash of cultures and

spiritual extremism, which made it difficult for the Japanese to surrender, only emerged in the modern age and was not based on ancestral traditions and customs. The 1930s saw an obsession with honorable death on the battlefield which an obvious correlation with a rise in anti-Western sentiment. It was no less than an emergence of a new style nationalism, rather than a revival of ancestral traditions or culture, and was firmly tied up to a desire to exclude the West. This kind of cultural nationalism reemerged in the form of Japanese resentment against the Western victors' punishment and their sympathetic feelings for the minor war criminals. It more or less prevented postwar Japanese from recognizing their "sufferings" whilst acknowledging the "facts" about their ordeals.

When the peace treaty went into effect in 1952, the Japanese government, was besieged by the large numbers of petitions for prompt release of imprisoned Japanese war criminals, and decided to send a special delegate to the Western Allies to seek amnesty for these prisoners. In Britain, in the Netherlands, and also in Australia, Tsuchida Yutaka, the delegate, met with was either strong hesitation or prompt refusal. On returning to his country, Tsuchida made a report on the Western Allies' reactions:

> The attitude taken by the British was, in summary, quite similar to that taken by the Americans, but was ever more sensitive to predictable reactions of her public opinion and parliament. It is clear that the British government intends to handle this subject very carefully because they believe that, given the circumstances that her ordinary nationals don't have good feelings towards Japan, it is quite

> possible that a lenient resolution [for the Japanese war criminals issue] could bring the government itself into a very tight corner.[15)]

Wakimura Yoshitarô, a former President of the Japan Academy and dean of Japanese economists, reflected later that he had been "asked by the embassy to try a negotiation with the British and ask them not to *advertise* so much the issue of the mistreatment of the POWs."[16)] He thus tried to convince his British counterparts by arguing that "Japanese soldiers could not refuse any of their superiors' commands because they were ordered to observe their superiors' commands as if they were the Emperor's commands, no matter what:"

> Now their argument was that, soldiers might not be held responsible but, where officers caused the death of POWs without trial following commands from their superiors, they were in the wrong because they should know about the treaty on POWs. In other words, all officers, including commanders and executors, are responsible for their acts. In return, I asked what was his opinion about indiscriminate bombing and atomic bombs, and he answered that in war, like love, every means to an end is acceptable. However, POWs had surrendered and given up fighting. He seemed unable to say that the Japanese army had not acknowledged this point.

This kind of argument would often be repeated, especially when there was a wish to focus on victimization by the Western Allies. Many Japanese tended to feel that, if they had to confess to past wrong doings, they ought

to demand reciprocal confessions from the other side.

2. Death of the Emperor and Impact of the British Tabloids

It was in the late 1980s when the nation again realized this issue was still alive. There were dozens of critical statements in the foreign mass media about the dying Emperor Hirohito. These included the British tabloid newspapers, in the context of what took place during the war.[17] As far as these tabloid articles were concerned, this criticism was unexpected by the Japanese public who had embraced a romantic myth of their own monarch: Britain and Japan, although geographically far apart, were psychologically close because of their various similarities, the most essential and mysterious among these being the existence of constitutional monarchies "with the longest historical traditions" in both countries.

What the tabloids refused to acknowledge was this image which the Japanese public held of themselves. The postwar monarchy in Japan had been encouraged by the US Occupation authorities to recast itself into the same mould as the British monarchy.[18] Publicizing Hirohito's *own* experiences in Britain as Crown Prince and his *personal* respect for the British constitution served to create a postwar image of a "peace-loving, constitution-observing emperor" whose wish for peace had earlier been often hampered by the jingoists and the chauvinists who surrounded him. The shared elements of constitutional monarchy were often used domestically as a vehicle for spreading a postwar image of Emperor Hirohito. The Japanese public was encouraged to believe that the continuation of very ceremonial monarchy in their postwar democracy, as in Britain, was an entirely natural process deriving from an ancient history.

What the Emperor's trip to European countries disclosed was, however, something which the Japanese public had often forgotten: their monarch was, in the foreigners' eyes, inescapably associated with war memories and questions of "war responsibility." The postwar image of the Emperor became confused in Japan after his visit to Europe in 1971 and his encounters with "ordinary" European citizens. It is possible to say that subsequent debates by Japanese left-leaning intellectuals on the Emperor's "war responsibility" and Hirohito's own response in the mid- 1970s were initially motivated by what happened during the visits to Europe in 1971 and to the US in 1975.

In 1988-1989, it seemed likely that the British tabloid comments on Emperor Hirohito would have the same effect. In reality, the voices from Europe had a rather different impact on the Japanese public. Many Japanese had been embarrassed by the excesses of the Japanese mass media which went on scattering, almost every minute, information about Emperor Hirohito's state of health. It is true, too, that critical voices from Asian countries against this totalitarian-like phenomenon in the Japanese media were making more Japanese think about Japan's past aggressions and the oppression earlier inflicted upon the neighbors. Yet, for those who had a historical consciousness that both Britain and Japan had been "guilty" of their respective colonial rules over Asian nations, the British tabloid comments, the most sensational among the foreign commentary of the period to and after the Emperor's death, now seemed to rather blind to their own "past". To those Japanese who had embraced romantic ideas about royal "similarity," the tabloid articles was their first encountering the "masses" of Britain at the very end of the Shôwa period. A Japanese

journalist in London lamented that the statements made by The Sun and The Daily Star were "too exaggerated and sensational to be translated into the Japanese language." The feelings among British ex-POWs and their demonstrations irritated the Japanese whose image of "*Igrisu* [=Britain]" had been simply made within a set of royal myths and *The Times* articles.

3. Compensation and Reconciliation

Five weeks before the Emperor's death in 1989, in the House of Commons, a motion for reparations payable for ex-POWs of the Japanese was supported by more than 200 MPs. The motion stressed "that [Anglo-Japanese] relations will not fully blossom until the wrongs done during the Second World War to Allied prisoners are fully accepted by the Japanese Government and due reparation made." [19] In the following years, through various House debates, the British government was often urged to support the compensation claimants, and finally in 1994-98, class-action lawsuits against the Japanese government were initiated by non-governmental actors from the Netherlands, Britain, the US, Australia and New Zealand. The claimants strongly appealed to their governments to demand from Tokyo a sincere, heartfelt apology for the wrongs done during the war.

As far as the compensation issue was concerned, the attitude taken by the British government was similar to the Japanese who were reluctant to pay further reparations to the war victims. The authorities continued to state that the question of compensation had been legally settled by Articles 14 and 16 of the 1951 peace treaty. The British compensation claimants

filed their 1995 suit for reparation against Japan on the basis that the Japanese treatment of American, Australian and New Zealand prisoners of war and civilian detainees had been extremely inhumane.[20] In the two POW cases (the first brought by the Dutch in 1994, and the second by the British and others in 1995) which were deliberated by the Tokyo District Court, the main focus was on interpretation of Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 1907.[21] The legal issues were boiled down to the question of an individual person's right to claim compensation under international law. The decisions denied the claims of the plaintiffs based upon a lack of grounds for compensation, which was the pattern the Japanese courts had maintained in 1963. The British case was, like the Dutch case, dismissed in November 1998. Both cases went to appeal.

Among recent cases addressing relevant issues, only the decision on the Dutch POW case acknowledged the existence of cruel and inhuman treatment of prisoners and detainees by the Japanese during the war by stating that each of the various damages and injuries asserted by the respective plaintiffs was true. In other words, the court recognized the damages and injuries and indicated their illegality under international law while at the same time denying the claims by the plaintiffs, following the pattern of the decision in the so-called "Atomic Bomb Case (Shimoda Case, 1963)".[22]

Arguing that there was no rule of customary international law that grants a right of individual persons to claim compensation, the Japanese government was developing a specific policy towards to the "Far Eastern POWs" issue by the mid-1990s. To promote reconciliation, Tokyo sent to St. James Palace several senior diplomats with sensibilities about the

"strong feelings" held against Japan by British ex-POWs.

For the Japanese diplomats who would be paving a path for reconciliation with British ex-POWs, what was most fortune was that they could expect some advice and even voluntary cooperation from private sources. It was already in 1984 when the private veterans exchange visit was organized between the Burma Campaign Fellowship Group, London, and some volunteers of the All Japan Burma Veterans Association, Tokyo. The Japanese ex-soldiers sensed that their former enemies "never quite forgave" their government as well "for not acknowledging VJ day in the way in which they acknowledged VE day." [23] They tried to demonstrate their "welcome" towards the British, who some felt had "animosity to Japan was hinted at on their faces." [24] Yoshino Shûichirô, the Vice Chairman of the AJBVA, related that in 1989 approximately 1, 000 Japanese Burma veterans participated in the Tokyo reception to welcome 11 British visitors to Japan. According to Yoshino, inside the reception hall, an enormous handclap appreciated the British guests, who were immediately besieged by all the Japanese attendants. "Then I realised how our royal families feel when they are coming out among the public," reflected one of the British visitors when he later made a report on his pilgrimage to Japan.[25]

Hirakubo Masao, Counsellor of the BCFG, often flies back to Japan and invites his Japanese comrades, Japanese Burma campaign survivors to reconciliation activities. He explained that the Japanese who attended joint services in former battlefields and elsewhere, felt like the war dead were "pleased" with their reconciliation activities. Through joint pilgrimages, both British veterans and the Japanese felt that they had been were

released from “survival guilt.”

Although they did not concern themselves with POW issues, those Anglo-Japanese veterans’ movements for reconciliation made a crucial impact on Japanese diplomats who were anxious to atone for what the former British POWs and civilian internees had suffered during the war, within the limits acceptable to the Japanese public at home. The Foreign Ministry also support visit to Japan by ex-POWs lead by Keiko Holmes of AGAPE.[26] As the Tokyo spokesman confessed at a press conference in April 1998, the embassy of Japan in London spent “a considerable amount of time…working on the general issue of reconciliation…in the context of what took place during wartime.” The Japanese were anxious to meet each British ex-prisoner, face to face, and Fujii Hiroaki, Japanese Ambassador in 1994-1997 and his successor, Hayashi Sadayuki, went to the extent of asking for forgiveness from the British POWs who allowed the Japanese to do so. Meetings for “reunion” with ex-British POWs continue to be organized at regular intervals at the embassy. More than a hundred British ex-prisoners and their relatives, including the association leaders of the compensation claimants, gathered at the Japanese embassy for the farewell party for Numata Sadaaki, then Plenipotentiary Minister when he returned Tokyo in early 1998.

Still, their efforts for reconciliation were unrelated to Japan as a whole. The failure to establish a private foundation financed by Japanese companies seemed to be evidence of a lack of concern by ordinary Japanese about the British ex-POW issue. A possible project was initially discussed between the British and Japanese Prime Ministers, John Major and Hosokawa Morihiro, in September 1993 when the former visited Japan.

Major informed Hosokawa that he was examining whether non-governmental measures would assist in solving the problem and, based on the latter's agreement, Sir Kit McMahon, former deputy governor of the Bank of England, was appointed chairman of a committee to develop a possible project to establish a foundation which might provide practical help to British ex-POWs. However, when McMahon visited Tokyo in November 1994 to test reactions, what became clear was that the Japanese private sector was uniformly negative to the project the British government had proposed. McMahon could only conclude that this kind of approach was unlikely to succeed.

4. The VJ Day to Emperor Akihito¡s visit to Britain

Voices demanding an apology and compensation of the Japanese were getting more vigorous in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the victory over Japan, and public opinion in Britain seemed to be severely critical of Japan and her nationals in this regard. In London, Japanese younger travelers were delighted with the fireworks shot off to celebrate the victory over Japan a half century ago; some Japanese living in Britain even found themselves obliged to guard their self-control in public. Toshiko Marks, an author living in London, expressed her appreciation to a group of the Anglo-Japanese veterans from BCFG for the "one and only ceremony for reconciliation" they hosted at Westminster Abbey while expressing her anger over the VJ Day celebrations:

> Over twenty-five years since I started my life in Britain, I have never felt before such displeasure. I had to complain to one of my British

> friends on the phone that it looked as if I lived in enemy country. Then, on 18 August, a postcard came from her saying, "Take heart. *The war* will end soon…On 20 August 1995, the *war* ended. *Britain defeated Japan*." [27)]

The author warned that "easy apologies" by the Japanese government had rather worsened the whole situation in Britain.

On VJ Day 1995, Murayama Tomiichi, then Prime Minister, issued a statement expressing deep remorse and apology to the victims of the Japanese, including the former POWs of the Western Allies. As part of an effort to "face up to the facts of history," he had already announced in 1994 a ten-year, 650-million-pound reconciliation program, "The Peace, and Friendship Initiative" designed mainly for Asian neighbors, including exchange visits, historical research and scholarships to Japanese schools for grandchild. The main focus of the initiative was Asian neighbors, but the Western Allies were also invited to take part, and 800 thousand pounds were further offered for Britain later, in 1998. Sir Alastair Goodlad, a government minister, emphasized just after the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day that the initiative should not be dismissed because it "provides evidence that the Japanese Government are sensitive to the need…and to respond to the concerns" strongly felt in the country.[28)]

It was after the fiftieth anniversary of the war that the British government came out with a policy of encouraging "all initiatives which promote reconciliation and recognize the sacrifices made by former prisoners of war".[29)] Tokyo reminded the British that the war criminals had already been executed or punished by the war crimes courts after the

war, and expressed "a strong desire to promote reconciliation with former prisoners of war," but reiterated that the government was not prepared to reopen the peace treaty. In early 1998, Hashimoto Ryûtarô, then Prime Minister, contributed a statement including apology to The Sun. The tabloid paper commented that Hashimoto's statement had "the official backing of the Japanese government," unlike the statement by Murayama in 1995.

In May of that year, Emperor Akihito's state visit to Britain took place. The state visit should have been the highlight of the achievement of Anglo-Japanese reconciliation made by the governments as well as those privately involved in reconciliation over the last decades. By then, the reconciliation initiatives offered by Tokyo had won some British Burma veterans to friendship with "yesterday's enemy." The veterans associations, such as the Royal British Legion, the Burma Star Association and the Far Eastern POWs Association, had clarified by then that they would not seek compensation, nor go to make protests against the Queen's guests, at the Emperor's state visit. Among them, the Royal British Legion specifically showed their concern for the reconciliation initiatives that Hashimoto offered, and Hashimoto's apology, which was published in The Sun, was welcomed by Blair as "a sign of a blossoming friendship between Britain and its former enemy." By the time of the state visit in May 1998, the Legion had accepted a role in promoting reconciliation initiatives, taking over the sorts of achievements developed by the BCFG and the AJBVA in March 1998 when Graham Dawning, National Chairman of the RBL, made a visit to Japan with other Legion members.

Others refused the "reconciliation package" as a "pathetic insult."

Blair stated to ex-prisoners of the Japanese that they had the right to demonstrate their protest against the Emperor in a "dignified way" and reminded them of the huge economic links between Japan and Britain. Hundreds of ex-prisoners and their relatives turned their backs in protest to the parade welcoming the Emperor. A British former POW burnt the Japanese national flag in protest during the Emperor's tour through London.[30)]

Japanese mass media reported in a relatively quiet tone what happened in London during the Emperor's visit. Some Japanese intellectuals argued that the Japanese government should rather give priority to winning over Asian neighbors to friendship and mutual trust with Japan and that the current Anglo-Japanese reconciliation movement completely lacked such an "Asian viewpoint."[31)]

Recent Development and Conclusion

The British government is currently considering payment of a special gratuity for ex-POWs of the Japanese and their widows, something which has been debated in the House of Commons since March 2000. This initiative was initially suggested by a British Burma veteran, Philip Malins, who is a member of the Royal British Legion, the Dunkirk Veterans Association and the Burma Campaign Fellowship Group. In the Second World War, Malins fought against the Germans and then against the Japanese, and in 1945 in French Indo China he commanded Gurkha and Japanese infantry saving the lives of local people, and survived many ambushes. Malins explained what had motivated him to devote himself to Anglo-Japanese reconciliation as follows:

> He remembers with great sadness every race who died and suffered in war, and particularly the 22 Japanese soldiers killed in an ambush when he gave the order to open fire on them. He recalls them as young men like him, in no way responsible for the war, who fought bravely to the death.[32]

In late 1998, he brought together the compensation claimant associations and the Royal British Legion to campaign for a special gratuity from the government. Several months before that, in January that year, it was reported that the British government had rejected a close examination of the possibility of further compensation, at a higher rate than had actually been paid in the 1950s as a result of Article 16 of the 1951 peace treaty.[33] What was disclosed then was that Lord Reading had agreed on 26 May 1955 that the British government should not take advantage of Article 26 of the San Francisco Treaty, which provided for further claims if Japan concluded agreements with other countries more advantageous than to the original signatory countries. His footnote said "we are at present unpopular enough with the Japanese without trying to exert further pressure which would be likely to cause the maximum resentment for the minimum advantage" [34]

According to the "Background Briefing", which was mainly drafted by Malins himself, the Royal British Legion was invited by the FEPOWs Associations in January 1999, to co-ordinate a request for a special ex-gratia payment from the British government in recognition of the hardship and suffering they experienced at the hands of the Japanese.[35] The document describes some particular features of a half the sufferings

the victims had experienced for three and a half years during the war and also for a half a century since their captivity. FEPOW deaths as a percentage of FEPOWs captured were the highest rate of all the battle fronts involving British troops, including the Normandy Landings and the Burma Campaign, in all of which casualties in total were far below the 25 % rate of FEPOWs who died or were killed in captivity.[36] After the war, they always suffered trauma:

> …with constant threat of death, disease, beatings, torture, starvation, seeing their comrades die around them, and taking part in burying them. Many never settled down after liberation and suicides occurred. It is doubtful that any other major group of our citizens in this century has suffered such trauma…Their demobilisation entitlements at the end of the war were based on rank when captured and length of service. A private, for example, might have become a sergeant or been commissioned…under normal circumstances in three and a half years with enhanced entitlements appropriate to rank. Under this system a man who never left British soil or heard a shot or bomb dropped would more than likely have received a higher demobilisation gratuity. For many years FEPOWs and their widows struggled to obtain benefits and had to bring up their young families on inadequate pensions, compounded with bitterness at the attitude of successive governments. Great effort had to be expended in wringing pensions and other benefits for FEPOWs from reluctant Governments." [37]

The campaign thus suggests that the special gratuity should be 10,000 pounds for each ex-POW of the Japanese and widow "in gratitude for all they suffered in captivity on behalf of their country." There is no precedent for such a payment for the government; but the Isle of Man government has paid that amount to each of their 23 POWs of the Japanese and civilian internees.

This can be seen as one of the most meaningful, grass-root achievements of domestic reconciliation between the "forgotten" ones and their government. Many of them felt an intense sense of injustice and abandonment by previous governments of both countries. Jack Chalker, ex-POW of the Japanese and an excellent artist, who secretly recorded life in the camps, comments that neither the government nor the army has learnt a sufficient lesson from their experiences:

> It remains a constant irritant to many ex-POWs that British Governments postwar, consistently, and perhaps deliberately, avoided any open enquiry or R*o*yal Commission to investigate the gross military and civil complacency and negligence on the part of British Command in Malaya which led to its fall and that of Singapore. It also lead to the greatest and most ignominious defeat in Britain history and a period of unrelieved horror for the Chinese and Malay civilian population for the following four years. Vital facts have been blandly smothered in a mass of technical detail in official British war histories over the early post-war years. [38)]

The British initiative of a special gratuity may inspire the Japanese

government to explore a further stage of international reconciliation. A specific feature of Japan's reconciliation policy towards Britain has been that late- coming compensation claimants against them should equally be dealt with under the terms of the total amnesty that the Japanese felt had been given to the Western former enemy nations during the peace treaty negotiations of 1951. In one sense, the British initiative can be seen as resonant with Tokyo's reconciliation diplomacy, even if the payment could result in a feeling that the Japanese being unprepared to entertain any suggestion of such a payment, from public or private sources, left the onus entirely on the British government. Arguably, it is possible for the Japanese government to strengthen the Murayama initiative, establishing an Anglo-Japanese joint reconciliation commission would be an alternative.

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1）Numata Sadaaki, "Imêji to genjitsu: Nichi-Ei kankei seijuku no 30 nen (Image and Reality: Thirty Years of Maturation in Anglo-Japanese Relations)," Gaikô Fôramu, May 1998.
2）N. M. Kosuge, "Religion, the Red Cross and the Japanese Treatment of POWs," in Philip Towle et al., Japanese Prisoners of War, London, Hambledon Press, October 2000 (forthcoming).
3）Philip Towle, "Japanese Treatment of Prisoners in 1904-1905, Foreign Officers' Reports," Military Affairs, October 1975.
4）Philip Towle, "The Japanese Army and Prisoners of War," Japanese Prisoners of War.
5）Furyo-jôhôkyoku, Furyo-toriatsukai no kiroku, 1955.

6) WO32/14550. Major General H.D.W. Sitwell, Report, [1945], quoted from S. J. Flower, "British Prisoners of War of the Japanese, 1945-1945," tr. by N. M. Kosuge "Nihongun no Eigunhoryo, 1941-1945" Nichi-ei Kôryû-shi," Tokyo University Press, 2000.

7) Kosuge, "Religion, the Red Cross and the Japanese Treatment of POWs."

8) Philip Towle, "Introduction," Japanese Prisoners of War.

9) N.M. Kosuge, "Publicity and the Racial War," Ippan-kyôiku-ronju, Yamanashi Gakuin University, 1999; "Atrocities stories of the Japanese and the Foreign Office, 1941-1945", (forthcoming).

10) Statement by Anthony Eden, Hansard, 28 January 1944, col. 1032.

11) Yamakiwa Akira and Nakamura Masanori ed., Shiryô Nihon Senryô 1, Tennnoô-sei (Documents on the Occupation of Japan, vol. 1, "The Emperor-System"), Ôtsuki Shoten, 1990.

12) International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Proceedings, pp. 27,953-9.

13) XVIIth International Red Cross Conference (Stockholm, August 1948), Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its Activities during the Second World War (September 1 1939 — June 30 1947), vol. 1: General Activities, "XII The Far Eastern Conflict," pp. 437-514.

14) See B.V.A. Röling and Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond, Polity, 1944.

15) Hômu-daijin Kanbô Shihô Hôsei-kyoku, Senpan shakuhô shiryô, 1967. On the Tsuchiya Delegation, see Yoshida Yutaka, Nihonjin no Sensôkan (Japanese Views on the War), Iwanami Shoten, 1995.

16) Wakimura Yoshitarô, "Gakusha to sensô (The Scholar and the War) speech on 22 June 1992; "Gakusha to sensô: Arisawa sensei wo shinonde (The Scholar and the War: for the Memory of Prof. Arisawa," Gakushi Kaihô, 1992.

17) In Japan as well, a lot of investigations were made on the foreign reactions to the death of Emperor Hirohito. Concerning the Far Eastern POW issue, see Yui Daizaburô and N. M. Kosuge, Rengô-koku horyo gyakutai to sengo-sekinin (The Mistreatment of Allied POWs and Japan's Postwar Responsibility), Iwanami-shoten, 1993.

18) To echo Tessa Morris-Suzuki, the British royal image was "not an image which commanded awe of fear or patriotic passion [but] the myth of a harmless monarchy…portrayed by the British royal family and the pageantry which surrounded them as quaint but picturesque parts of a unique historical tradition (regardless of the fact that most of the traditions were in reality less than a

century old)". Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Myth of the Harmless Monarchy," tr., by N.M. Kosuge, "Mugaina kunshu-sei to shiteno Tennoô-sei wa ikinokoreru ka," Sekai, January 2000.

19) Speech by Ian Bruce, House of Commons, Hansard, 24 November 1988.

20) As to the British case, 998 Hanrei Taimuzu 92; the Dutch case, 991 Hanrei Taimuzu, 262.

21) As to the subject, see Fujita Hisakazu et al, War and the Rights of Individuals-Renaissance of Individual Compensation (English/Japanese), Nihon Hyoron-sha, 1999; N.M. Kosuge, "Rengou-koku kara no Hoshou-youkyuu (Claims from the Western allies)," Chapter V, Gaidobukku sengohoshô (Guidebook on Postwar Compensation), Nashinoki-sha, 1994.

22) The "Atomic Bomb Case" had been brought into the Tokyo District Court by the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki considering that the dropping of the Atomic bomb by the US violated international law. They filed a claim against the Japanese government for its renunciation of the compensatory right against the US and claimed compensation based on the National Tort Act, Article 1, and the Constitution, Article 29; the case was dismissed on 7 December 1963. Fujita Hisakazu, "Introduction: Post-war Compensation Litigation from the Viewpoint of International Law", Fujita et al, ibid.

23) Statement by Robert Rhodes James, Hansard, June 6 1991.

24) Yoshino Shuichiro, "Kinou no teki wa kyou no tomo (Yesterday's Enemy is Today's Friend)," Bessatsu Rekishi-dokuhon, Eikyu-hozon-ban, 1998.

25) Yoshino, ibid.

26) As to Keiko Holmes of AGAPE, see Saitô Kazuaki, "Towards Reconciliation," Towle et al., Japanese Prisoners of War.

27) Toshiko Marks, Sensho-koku Igirisu he, Nihon no iibun (What Japan Has to Say to Britain the Victor), Soshi-sha, 1996.

28) Speech by Alastair Goodlad, House of Commons, Hansard, 10 May 1995.

29) Written answer by Hanley to question by Alfred Morris, 13 January 1997.

30) Daily Record: The Sun, 27 May1998.

31) For instance, see Nakahara Michiko, "Horyo to *Romusha* no Aida (Between the POWs and Asian Forced-labors," Sekai, June 1998.

32) Letter to the author on 2 September 2000.

33) The Observer, 18 January 1998: Arthur Titherington, The Japanese Labour Camps Survivors Association, and Steve Cairns, "Far East Prisoners of War."

FJ1483/1.

34) FJ1483/1. The Royal British Legion, "Background Briefing for Pariamentarians on the Claim for a Special Gratuity for Former Far East Prisoners of War (FEPOWS)", 29 June 1999.

35) FEPOWs were represented by the National Federation of Far Eastern Prisoners of War Clubs and Associations (NFFCA) and the Japanese Labour Camp Survivors Association (JLCSA). According to the "Background Briefing," They "sought unsuccessfully further Compensation through the Japanese government…However, with continuing failure of the Court action against the Japanese, and evidence…of the failure of previous British Governments to seek further compensation from the Japanese when it was possible to do so, the views of FEPOWS have changed (p.1)."

36) Of the UK Armed Forces total of 4,683,443 in June 1945, 266,443 (5%) died (HMSO Cmd 6832, June 1946). "Background Briefing," p.3.

37) "Background Briefing," p.4.

38) Jack Chalker ARCA RWA Hon FMAA, Image as a Japanese Prisoner of War, published by The Friends of Jack Chalker, 1998, p.7.